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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

THE LIMITS OF COVERAGE IN WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION-THE DUAL REQUIREMENT
REAPPRAISED
WEX S. MALONEt

If the cost of employee injuries is to be absorbed ultimately by
consumers, it is essential as a matter of policy for workmen's compensation to exclude from coverage all accident risks that do not result from
engaging in the productive process or that are not enhanced by that
process in some determinable way. Every risk that endangers a worker
operates in a rough sense to remove him from participation in the
process of production. If this were the only required relationship between the risk encountered by the injured worker and that process,
coverage would be universal and no risk whatsoever would be eliminated. Since it is difficult to justify imposing such an extravagant accident cost upon consumers as a class, it is essential that a process be
devised to limit the range of compensable risks.
The problem of defining the compensable risk is only a part of the
broader problem of establishing the coverage of the compensation
scheme itself. A plan of legislative origin such as the compensation
scheme is not designed to reimburse all persons for all hurts of whatever
nature, wherever suffered, and however caused. There must be limitations, such as those relating to the place or time at which the injury
occurred, the nature of the hazard or risk that brought about the harm,
or the kind of activity in which the victim was engaged when he was
injured.
An inquiry into the possibilities of establishing effective limits for
compensation can stress either of two major aspects. We can ask why
any proposed limitation is or is not an acceptable one, and we can make
a separate inquiry as to what is the most appropriate and effective
means of enacting that limitation. The importance of making a sound
determination as to what policies should control is obvious, but the
devising of felicitous phrases to put those policies into effective operation is a matter whose importance may all too readily be ignored. Perhaps we feel that policy considerations, once formulated, will in some
way automatically dictate the language to be used, and we may be
tempted to dismiss word craftsmanship as serving chiefly for decoration.
tBoyd Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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Of course, it is true in a broad sense that the purpose of any expression
is solely to effect whatever policy underlies it; but the establishment of
a working relationship between raw policy and the expression in which
policy should be couched is a subtle and complex matter. Not only does
policy motivate the choice of expression; likewise the expression selected
can determine in many ways the policy that will finally emerge in operation. Words generate distinctive policies of their own as they are subjected to judicial interpretation, and often these ultimately control.
How should we choose the appropriate phrases that enable us to
cover those risks, but only those risks, that have been accepted as compensable? This is the chief concern of this article. It does not follow,
however, that making language the focal point of attention indicates
indifference towards the fixing of policy itself. The mutual interaction
of words upon policy and of policy upon words demands full respect
whatever emphasis is chosen.
THE PROCESS OF DEFINITION

The most common language technique for delimiting compensation
coverage is by defining terms. Compensation acts are filled with legislative definitions. In most statutes, for instance, there appears some definition of an "employee," who is protected by the scheme, and a "contractor," who is generally excluded. Similarly, the term "accident,"
which characterizes one distinct manner in which harm can occur, may
be given an elaborate definition so as to exclude other types of injury.
Those injuries that entitle the sufferer to compensation payments are
carefully defined in terms of "disability" according to their effect on the
victim's prospective earning capacity. Such instances of definition are
legion.
Even after a definition has been carefully devised, there will remain
ambiguities that are certain to tax the ingenuity of the judge or other
trier whenever the term is before him. Frequently, a term employed for
the purpose of elaborating a given definition must itself be subjected to
further refinement. At times no attempt is made by the draftsman to
define some key word affecting coverage, but even that deliberate determination is, in a sense, an act of definition. It may have been felt that
the meaning was obvious or that it had been reduced to the lowest terms
possible, or the author may have concluded that further refinement
would result merely in awkwardness. There appear frequently such
terms as "agricultural," "domestic," or "casual" employment, in which
the entire appropriate meaning is left to determination by the judicial
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process. Here a definition will ultimately take shape through an accretion of decisions, and despite the fact that the elaboration of definitions
has at times proved burdensome for courts (and resulted in an imposing
mass of decisions), the operation is one with which courts have long been
familiar, and by and large it has worked well when properly limited.
Paradoxically, the term "definition" itself needs defining. For present purposes it will be used to indicate only one of several processes to
which a judge or other trier might resort in proceeding from a given
expression to a determination that is controlled by that expression.
"Defining," as the term is used here, is a search for some corresponding
expression which, once applied to the facts at hand, will lead automatically to the proper determination that must be made. In other words,
resort to the process of definition in its epitome should minimize or
avoid for the trier any need to make a policy determination.
The areas of compensation coverage that can be successfully fixed
and bounded through the making of definitions are not numerous. The
process works best when the term under consideration is susceptible to
a limited number of contrasting meanings. It is markedly effective when
the choice to be made under the legislative definition is one between
several recognized legal concepts whose attributes are well understood
by lawyers. For example, does the term "employee," as used in the
statute, include a contractor, a corporate officer, a partner, or a pure
agent? A definition here can readily supply the answer. So long as the
range of choice is limited, the definitional technique gives little trouble.
It is also interesting that in workmen's compensation, the definitional
process is used most successfully when the rough outside boundaries of
coverage are being determined. For example, employment can be successfully identified through such words as "industrial," "domestic,"
"regular," "casual," "agricultural, .... hazard," "public," "private,"
and so forth.
Limitations on the usefulness of the definition process are quickly
reached. Beyond lie vast polymorphic areas that will not submit to any
such simplistic attack. Trouble will be encountered whenever the author
of a statute finds it necessary to limit coverage through reference to the
precise situation in which the injured worker found himself at the moment of the accident, which is frequently the case. It may be necessary
to inquire what the employee was doing when he was injured: was he
working, playing, eating, resting, or standing by for further orders? Was
he attending to his personal needs, was he misbehaving and neglecting
his work, or was he even disobeying the orders of his employers when
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he was injured? The variety is almost endless. The same is true whenever
the place of accident is important in determining coverage. Where was
the worker at the moment he was injured? Was he on the work permises?
Was he at home? Was he on the public streets? Was he at a place to
which he had been ordered or at a place which was offbounds or forbidden to him? Similarly, the time at which the accident happened may be
determinative of the right to compensation. An accident can happen
after working hours, before work has begun, during a coffee break, or
at a time when the worker was laying aside his work temporarily for
personal reasons.
Any attempt to limit coverage by the time or place of the happening
or by reference to what the employee was doing when injured requires
more room for a policy determination tailored to fit the precise occasion
than is possible through the making of definitions. There are several
reasons why this is so. We have observed that the mechanics of definition can work effectively only where the number of possible "meanings"
that can compete for the definer's choice are limited in number. Conversely, whenever the term to be defined has a broad range of possible
meanings, trouble will be encountered. Any attempt to select one meaning as being more appropriate than any other is likely to prove frustrating unless the policy to be served is limited and is understood precisely
at the time the definition is undertaken.
An illustration may be helpful. Assume that the authors of proposed legislation have reached a rough policy conclusion that compensation should be limited in accidents that befall the victim while he is "at
work." Here the need for some kind of language refinement is desperate, and yet a simple definition is almost certain to fail. Suppose that
the victim is a carpenter. Is he at work only when he is actively altering
the shape or structure of the material with which he is dealing? Must
he be hammering or sawing or hoisting a piece of wood into position?
Is he to be denied compensation if he is injured while mounting a ladder?
Or assuming that an act this closely related must be regarded as "at
work," suppose that the injury occurs while the carpenter is filing his
saw or selecting a new tool or that he is injured while idly standing by
waiting for his helper to bring him more nails. It is clear that the phrase
"at work" explodes into fragments whenever its definition is attempted
in the face of such possibilities. Of course, the author of a measure
might envisage some or all of the specific situations with which he
proposes to deal and then indicate whether they are covered or excluded.
He may choose not to limit himself to the phrase "at work," and may
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add such terms as "acts preparatory and immediately preceding work,"
"conduct during a recreational period," or accidents occurring "on
premises," or "while going to and coming from work," etc. It is obvious
that by and large this is an awkward approach that results in a fragmented coverage with recurring gaps to be filled through resort to analogy.
The Pennsylvania provision on coverage affords an outstanding
illustration of this type of legislation:
The term "injury by an accident in the course of his employment".
shall include . . . injuries sustained while the employe [sic] is actually
engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer,
whether upon the employer's premises or elsewhere, and shall include
all injuries caused by the condition of the premises or by the operation
of the employer's business or affairs thereon, sustained by the employe,
who, though not so engaged, is injured upon the premises occupied by
or under the control of the employer, or upon which the employer's
business or affairs are being carried on, the employe's presence thereon
being required by the nature of his employment.'
The authorship of this unique provision is traceable to Professor
Francis Bohlen of the University of Pennsylvania Law School. This
noted scholar served as counsel to the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Board at the time of the adoption of the Pennsylvania act.
Bohlen had made an intensive study of the English workmen's compensation statute of 1897 and had indicated profound concern over the
highly restrictive coverage and the deplorable uncertainty that had re2
sulted from the course of decisions interpreting the English measure.
He sought to avoid this in Pennsylvania through several devices. The
one to be noted here is the attempt to specify the time, space, and
conduct features with as much detail as possible, resulting in the provision that appears above. However, any notion that either simplicity or
more generous coverage could result from a cumbersome definitional
attack of this kind has been entirely disapproved by the subsequent
course of decision in Pennsylvania.
A few other states attempted similarly to specify certain employee
conduct (usually the acts of going to or coming from the place where
'PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411 (1952).
2Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts (pts. 1-3), 25 HARV.
L. REV. 328, 401, 517 (1911-1912). "[I]t is essential that the act should be so drawn as to be as
far as possible automatically applicable to any given state of fact ....
" Id. at 332.
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the worker performed his duties) that was to be accorded treatment
separate from the rest of the act.3 All such provisions with their narrow
particulars have proved unsuccessful. They have either lost their identity
as they have become absorbed under broader conceptions or have persisted as awkward anomalies in an otherwise fairly consistent scheme of
coverage developed through court decisions. There are almost no recent
instances of this general type of attack in the statutes.
THE DETERMINATION OF COVERAGE BY THE COURTS

Generally, the legislatures have recognized that limits of protection
in terms of time and place cannot be successfully fixed in advance.
Accordingly, they have phrased the compensation measures so as to vest
courts with ample discretion to work out appropriate policies of limitation in the course of litigation. More than a half century of experience
in the administration of workmen's compensation has confirmed the
wisdom of this approach. In virtually all statutes, the legislature has
been content merely to impose in a single phrase the requirement that
the injury be occasioned by an accident during the course of
employment. This classic expression first appeared in the original English workmen's compensation statute, and it has been faithfully copied
in virtually every American act.4 The language is blunt and unqualified,
and even the general direction that the inquiry should follow is suggested
only vaguely by the words, during and course. The trier is merely directed to think in terms of time, place, and worker activity and to relate
these in some way to the employment status of the victim. The big
question remains: How close should the relationship be? Which is the
most important, time, place, or activity? On all this the statute is utterly
silent. There is no hint, no suggestion of any kind.
3

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-508(k) (Supp. 1972); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 412.1 (1948)
(accidents on premises while going to or coming from work accorded special treatment, with special

reference as to time before and after working hours); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151(6) (1968) (leaving
line of duty for personal purpose expressly excluded from coverage); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-1012.12 (Supp. 1971) (excludes from coverage accidents occurring on the way to and from work);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.03(l)(c)(i) (1961) (accidents on premises while going to or coming from

work accorded special treatment); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 27-49[III](a) (1967) (excludes from coverage accidents occurring on the way to and from work). Provisions such as these are likely to be
legislative correctives to remedy some unacceptable decision. ,
'The statutes in "[forty-two states . . . have adopted the entire British Compensation Act

formula .... " I A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 6.10, at 3-1 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as LARSON]. Certain variations of the formula will be discussed in the text
hereafter.
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Nevertheless, with this sparse guidance the courts over a period of
about sixty years have evolved an amazingly well-ordered body of law.'
One set of rules, for example, has developed relating to employee journeys to and from work,' while others are directed towards the work
connection of some given item of employee conduct, such as his activities during lunch hour or during recreational periods 7 or while he is
serving his personal interests.' Through a gradual accretion of decisions,
policies that once emerged as fragments have fallen into patterns. Indeed, court-made law has filled out to the point that it might be possible
to make fairly dependable predictions on coverage under almost any
given set of facts involving the time and place of accident or the activity
of the worker when he was injured. Compensation, however, does not
depend solely upon the circumstances of time, place, and employee
conduct, because the needs of policy demand an additional dimension-the character of the risk or hazard that brought about the accident.
THE CHARACTER OF THE EMPLOYMENT RISK

Ever since the inception of the workmen's compensation movement, persuasive arguments have been advanced that every accident
occurring during the course of the employment should be regarded as
compensable without indulging in further inquiry. Occasionally a legislature will decline to impose any further qualification than this. But
generally there is an insistence that the risk that brought about the
accident be related in some way to the nature of the employment. This
requirement, if kept within bounds sensitive to the needs of society, is
entirely consistent with the workmen's compensation principle. The fact
that the injury befell the worker while he was "on the job" should not
be sufficient in itself to warrant an award of compensation. For example, one might trip and fall anywhere. Is the fact that a worker trips on
the threshold of his place of employment sufficient justification for
transfering his accident costs to those who ultimately buy his employer's
goods, while the cost of a similar mishap occurring at the worker's own
door is to be supported by the worker himself, by charity, or by public
5Here, as elsewhere, no effort will be made to catalogue or otherwise deal in detail with the
myriad decisions concerning during-course-of or arise-out-of. I LARSON devotes 450 pages to the

two topics.
61d. §§ 15-19.
'Id. § 22.
8id. § 27.
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assistance? Hazards that can qualify as industrial or employment hazards must be distinguished from the general body of perils that indiscriminately beset mankind. In some way the risk must exist because of
some unique characteristic associated with work or the working environment. For example, the danger of electrocution is an employment
risk for the electrician but not for the hunter, while for the latter the
danger of being wounded by gunshot constitutes a fair risk of his employment. The employment risk may be of a kind that besets all mankind in general, but it may also be encountered more frequently by those
engaged in certain occupations. Thus anyone may be struck down in
traffic, but the chance of traffic accidents is much greater for truck
drivers. Hence, this is one of their occupational risks. Distinctions of
this kind are pregnant with policy considerations, and the author of a
compensation statute is prompted to search for language to characterize
the employment risk. Again, it is here that trouble begins.
Occasionally legislatures have resorted to designating risks that are
either totally excluded from coverage or are covered only under prescribed circumstances. Favorite targets for express provisions of this
kind are acts of nature (such as lightning), 9 horseplay injuries,"0 and
assaults by fellow workers or outsiders." Again, as with the handling
of the "during the course of" phenomenon, the designation of certain
narrow hazards for special definitional treatment has frequently been
the source of distortion or confusion.
Happily legislatures by and large have avoided the narrow definitional attack and have left to the courts the responsibility of forging
gradually the shape of the policies that give character to the compensable risk. Once more the language device is a non-communicative phrase.
The now familiar requirement that the accident happen during the
course of employment is joined with an equally plastic requirement that
the accident must arise out of the employment." How and to what
extent this is to be done is, as before, a matter upon which the act is
completely silent.
The difficulties with the "arising out of" requirement are even
greater than with the "during the course of" requirement, because while
TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (1967).
STAT. ANN. § 34:15-7.1 (1959).
"According to Larson, in twenty-three states the statutes expressly exclude injuries resulting
from "wilful intention to injure another." I LARSON § 11.15(d), at 3-155. For other assault provisions see W. MALONE & M. PLANT, CASES ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 244 (1963).
"The phrase prevails in forty-three states. 1 LARSON § 6.10.

"N.J.
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the latter at least contains the implied reference to time and place and
worker's conduct, the former does not. In response to the utter freedom
accorded them, the courts understandably saturated the phrase in the
ideology that was current at the time.
The first efforts of the courts to apply the "arising out of" requirement reflected faithfully the pervasive conservatism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Complex rules regulating the respective rights of master and servant under respondeat superior had
been taking shape over the past five or six decades, and the requirement
of fault had just unified as a rational science of torts what had formerly
been an indiscriminate collection of isolated wrongs. Already judges and
lawyers had forgotten the bastard origin of the fault requirement and
were prepared to confirm its source in antiquity and its eternal validity.' 3 It was therefore to be expected that the novel workmen's compensation scheme, with its cavalier disregard for blameworthiness, was foredoomed to a cold reception. Furthermore, the statutory origin of the
social welfare measures meant that they were in derogation of the common law and hence were strictly construed, despite admonitions of liberal construction appearing on the face of the statutes themselves.
No other phrase within the workmen's compensation yielded so
readily to restrictive interpretation as the few fragile words, "arising out
of the employment." From the outset, the courts insisted that the risk
of injury must be greater for the worker than for one "not so employed." The ambiguity inherent in this requirement is obvious. It is
necessary that the risk that caused the accident be compared with an
entirely unknown quality. Who is such a person who is not engaged in
the complainant's employment? The greater part of the accidents that
befall industrial workers- strains, injury by falling, burns, traffic mishaps, and similar casualties-are fairly typical of accidents that happen
in all walks of life. Are all these to be excluded from coverage because
they are not unique to the precise job assigned the worker? For a while
it appeared that the compensation acts would end up with such a narrow
range of coverage that they would be reduced to virtual impotency.
The restriction on protection was facilitated by an insistence on the
part of courts that coverage be confined to those risks that could be
contemplated in advance as incidental to the particular employment.
Thus the limiting phrases of foreseeability became part of compensation
"Malone, Damage Suits and the Contagious Principle of Workmen's Compensation, 12 LA.
L. REv. 231-32 (1952).
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law. Elaborate doctrines of proximate causation had already developed
in negligence cases, and judges of this period were steeped in the tort
philosophy that the worker contemplated and assumed all the ordinary
and expectable risks of employment when he accepted his job. It was
to be expected that the courts would follow the same approach when
dealing with the compensation statutes. By limiting compensation to
those accidents that resulted from a foreseeable risk that was characteristic of the particular employment involved, courts succeeded in downgrading the right to recover for the ordinary mishap. The same approach excluded from coverage accidents brought about by the employee's ministration to his personal needs or his pleasure. These were
ordinary risks of the employee's private life and were not contemplated
by the parties as special risks of the employment. Finally, accidents
attributable to the employee's own fault were considered matters related
to his private behavior. If the worker disregarded rules and went to
places where he should not have gone or did things that he should not
have done and was injured as a consequence, recovery was not allowed.
Consistent with this attitude, the employee's incautious or injudicious
behavior in many instances became a defense against recovery, despite
the clear legislative mandate that contributory negligence of the worker
should not preclude recovery.
It was these restrictive interpretations of workmen's compensation
that prompted Francis Bohlen in his classic study, "Problems in the
Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts,"' 4 to urge the avoidance
of the phrase "arising out of" in the American statutes. This advice did,
in fact, prompt the legislatures of several states to provide coverage
indiscriminately for all accidents that happened during the course of the
employment.' There is no evidence, however, to suggest that any useful
purpose could be served by extirpating the "arising out of" requirement.
The trouble lay not with the language but with the times. The phrase in
question could do no more than fix the trier's attention upon the character of the risk that brought about the accident. Whether the focus that
emerged reflected compassion for the plight of the victim or, on the
other hand, mirrored only a cautious husbanding of the assets of business was a matter determined by the prevailing social conscience of the
courts.
"Bohlen, supra note 2.
"See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02.8 (Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411 (1952);
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (1967); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.08.013 (1962).
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Indeed, one may also wonder why the language of proximate cause,
which was on the tongue of every lawyer at the inception of the compensation movement, was apparently rejected in the statutes of most
states.' 6 Why was the phrase "arising out of" the employment to be
preferred over "caused by" the employment? "Proximate cause" shares
with "arising out of" the quality of being utterly non-communicative.
Both expressions are the mere trappings of a judgment already formulated. Perhaps the reason for the rejection of causation language in the
new measures was the same reason that prompted Francis Bohlen to
urge the Pennsylvania legislature to avoid entirely the "arising out of"
phrase, which by then had become permeated with the stigma of conservatism. Possibly an uncritical resort to the language of proximate
cause, as understood by the contemporary lawyers, was also inappropriate for a new venture in compensation. But whether the substituted
''arising out of" phraseology chosen by Parliament fared any better as
a messenger for liberalism is open to serious question.
It is ironic that the same rejected phrases of proximate cause were
eventually resurrected and used to rid the "arising out of" concept of
some of its reactionary attaint. In order to appreciate how this occurred,
it is necessary to recall that during the early decades of compensation
history, courts insisted that no accident could arise out of employment
unless the accident risk was greater for the worker than for a person
not so employed. This was the so-called "increased risk test" whose
repressive effect was all too evident. The urge to repudiate this narrow
test was felt most uregently when a worker happened to be injured in
the public streets while carrying out the duties of his employment or
while moving from one working place to another. Here an application
of the increased risk rule in its strictest form threatened to exclude street
accidents from coverage almost completely.
A Massachusetts decision in 1917 illustrates how this could and did
happen. Claimant was a salesman of church goods whose duties obliged
him to walk or ride in the city streets during more than half his working
hours. When injured on a February day, he was walking in the middle
of the street, the sidewalk being impassable on account of ice. He
slipped on the ice and fell, sustaining a broken ankle. Even the increased
WIt would not be entirely accurate to state that causation language was entirely rejected. The

West Virginia statute refers to accidents "resulting from" the employment, W. VA.
§ 23-4-1 (Supp. 1972), and the Wyoming measure refers to "injuries.
employment," WVyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-49[III](a) (Supp. 1971).
ANN.

.

CODE

. as a result of their
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risk test, if applied with discrimination, could have resulted in recovery,
for the very frequency of claimant's exposure to the dangers of winter
streets could readily- be regarded as distinguishing his situation from
that of one not so employed. Recovery, however, was denied by the
Massachusetts high court, which observed, "It seems plain that the
danger of the employee slipping upon the ice in a public street was not
peculiar to his work, but was a hazard to persons engaged
in any em17
ployment who had occasion to travel along the streets."
But as time went on, the conservative impulse of the courts could
not withstand the pressure of the growing number of street injury cases.
Traffic presented a constant and increasing danger, and if a man's job
forced him into the streets on the occasion when he was injured what
difference should it make that others were similarly obliged to encounter
this same danger? The occasion that really counted was the one that
gave rise to the claim. In short, in these cases the increased risk test
failed miserably in meeting the more important demands of fair play.
The courts then were faced with the problem of how to circumvent the
increased risk test in the street injury cases and yet retain it for general
usage in other areas in which its limitations might still serve a useful
purpose.
The answer of the courts was the familiar device of causation,
which now was cast in the new role of liberalizing agent. The writers of
the opinions seized upon the close casual connection between the call
of duty and the victim's presence in the street where he was injured.
Under these circumstances, they argued, how could it be denied that the
risk arose out of the employment? By thus emphasizing the mechanics
of causation they diverted attention from all requirements of increased
risk."8
This attitude toward the danger of the streets soon acquired the
dignity of an independent "street risk" doctrine. The language of causation, having served its function, could now be stowed in the closet of
torts lore. The new phrase "street risk" succeeded in supplying a new
starting point from which further growth would be possible.
"Street risk" has since given way to "positional risk,"'" so that it
is now possible in many instances to justify an award of compensation
17Donahue's Case, 226 Mass. 595, 597, 116 N.E. 226, 227 (1917).
"The causation language in Kern v. Southport Mill, Ltd., 174 La. 431, 141 So. 19 (1932) is
particularly forceful and interesting.
"This interesting and useful term should be credited to Larson. I LARSON § 6.40.
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irrespective of the nature of the particular risk involved because the
duties of the employee placed him where the mishap occurred. The
matter of real importance was that the temper of the times demanded
a significant enlargement of the range of risks for which compensation
should be made available.
THE SUGGESTIVE POWER OF LANGUAGE

Up to this point, we have acknowledged that the generative forces
behind a workmen's compensation decision lie largely outside the power
of any language that may be employed. If this were the entire story, the
only function for language in determining the risks covered by workmen's compensation would be to supply some innocuous phrase that
could serve as a facade and yet would not get in the way of the important
business of determining such risks through instinctive judgments. Such
an explanation, however, would be grossly misleading because, while
language cannot and should not dominate the deliberations of a judge,
it nevertheless can help keep him within bounds. Language can exercise
a persuasive influence through its capacity to channel a court's deliberations. In short, the phrase chosen can pose the problem with some
degree of precision even though it cannot supply a definitive answer. For
this reason, attention will be centered hereafter upon the role that language can perform in guiding the course of decisions.
It is with reference to this capacity to channel the judging process
that the legislative formulas, "arising out of" and "during the course
of," have proved most serviceable because each invites exploration in a
specific direction. The "during the course of' requirement suggests that
the trier look into the place and the time the accident occurred and what
the worker was doing when he was injured, while the "arising out of"
requirement asks, in addition, what was the character of the risk that
brought on the injury.
The requirement, then, is dual, and it must be satisfied in toto. It
is not enough that the accident either happen during the course of
employment or that it arise out of it. It must do both. This duality of
requirement has had its critics. Already noted is Bohlen's insistence that
all accidents occurring during the course of the employment should be
covered without further inquiry." In interesting contrast to Bohlen's
'Similarly, the Wisconsin statute contains no language indicating that the accident arise out
of the employment, and provides coverage for any injury while "performing service growing out
of and incidental to his employment," Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.03(l)(c)(1) (Supp. 1972); yet the
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suggestion is the proposed model statute of the Department of Labor,
which was prepared in 1955 for discussion purposes. 2 Under this measure the entire burden of risk-sorting is placed on the "arising out of"
restriction. There is no insistence that the accident must also occur
during the course of the employment. The sponsors of this measure
appear to have believed that limitations as to the time and place of
accident have been proved by experience to be cumbersome and unduly
restrictive and that they are unnecessary so long as the character of the
risk that brought about the accident can be readily associated with the
nature of the job or the working environment. Thus it appears that both
aspects of the dual requirement have been attacked.
These criticisms are not without appeal. At first blush the elimination of one of the dual requirements would appear both to liberalize the
compensation scheme and to facilitate its administration. If the employee were obligated to satisfy only one requirement instead of two,
his changes of recovery would seem to be increased. Certainly there have
been many instances in which an injured worker established that his
accident occurred during the course of employment but could not establish that it arose out of the nature of his work. Similarly, on other
occasions an employee who was killed or injured by some hazard that
was clearly inherent in his job was denied compensation because at the
time of injury he was not within the course of his employment.
Nevertheless, this writer is convinced that both for fairness and for
flexibility of administration the dual character of the requirement has
marked advantages. The arguments in opposition to duality are
grounded upon an unrealistic view of the process of litigation. It is too
easy to assume that the trier first decides that the accident did or did
not happen during the course of the employment and, having once made
this determination upon facts that are presumed to be pertinent solely
Wisconsin Supreme Court has held in a case involving a death by lightning that it must be shown

that the death was not the result of a hazard common to persons generally.
It is true that there is no language in the act which limits it to injuries which are
incidental to and grow out of the employment, but the whole theory and purpose of the
Workmen's Compensation Act was to charge upon the industry as one of the necessary
elements of cost in the production of goods losses sustained by workmen in their employ-

ment. It was never intended to make the Workmen's Compensation Law an accident
insurance or health insurance measure.
Newman v. Industrial Comm'n, 203 Wis. 358, 360, 234 N.W. 495, 497 (1931).
2

This proposed model statute was released solely for discussion purposes to a group of persons
interested in workmen's compensation. It was released under the auspices of Professor Arthur
Larson of Duke University, who was then serving as an Associate Secretary of Labor.
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to that single inquiry, then proceeds in a separate inquiry to examine
the facts in the light of the requirement that the accident arise out of
the employment. If the inquiry is indeed a two-step operation, the claimant's double exposure to the chance of loss appears obvious. However,
the reliability of the two-step process rests upon the assumption that it
is possible to isolate each of the two inquiries and to reach a definitive
answer to one without being influenced by the answer to the other. It
must be assumed that each inquiry in each case can be unequivocally
answered yes or no. The worker must be regarded as either definitely
within the course of his employment or outside of it, and just as conclusively it must be determined that the risk either did arise out of the
employment or did not.
This, I suggest, does not adequately represent the approach of
courts to the risk phenomenon. The present rules concerning the course
of employment have been evolved by the courts through decisions in
marginal situations. Some activities of workers are securely within the
course of employment, while others barely fall within the concept. For
instance, the employee whose claim is based only on the fact that his
accident occurred on the employer's premises must expect more difficulty in securing compensation than another worker who was injured
while he was actively performing his duties. Similarly, a particular risk
does not conclusively either arise out of or fail to arise out of the
employment. Some risks, such as the risk of electrocution for the lineman or the risk of explosion for the handler of dynamite, can be readily
associated with the nature of the employers' businesses, while the risk
that a carpenter may be bitten by a house cat, that a stenographer may
be struck by an auto in traffic, or that a butcher's helper may be accidentally hit by the arrow from a child's bow are only tenuously related
to the working environment.
A little graphic imagery may be useful here. The concept of "during
the course of" can be envisioned as a circle whose center represents only
those accidents that happen while the victim is actively at work, while
he is moving from one work spot to another, or is otherwise responding
directly to the call of duty-all clearly occurring during the course of
employment. As we move slightly away from this center, we encounter
other ranges of activities. Closest, perhaps, is the situation of the worker
who is alert to the immediate call of duty but who is unavoidably idle
at the moment he is injured. Perhaps he awaits some tool that has been
sent for or sets aside his shovel while sheltering himself from a sudden
shower. Such idleness is dictated by the nature of the work and is
comfortably within the inner part of the conceptual circle.
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If the period of enforced idleness is extended to a matter of hours
and the accident occurs at some place other than the work premises (as
would be the case for the worker who is injured at home at a time when
he is subject to call), any conclusion relating to the "during the course
of" requirement becomes very difficult. In terms of our circle we have
moved decidedly away from the center and toward the perimeter.
The same approach is appropriate for other situations: accidents
during lunch hour or coffee break, accidents that happen just as the
employee leaves his home to go to work as compared with those that
happen as he enters his employer's plant, accidents that befall a truck
driver while he is proceeding on some route that he was ordered to
avoid, the slip in the shower at the hotel that breaks the hip of a traveling salesman who was preparing for bed-these and myriad other attendant circumstances that make up the infinite variety of work accidents in terms of time, place, or employee activity all have their proper
situs somewhere on the face of the circle that represents the "during the
course of" concept. Whether an accident falls near the center or, on the
other hand, is poised tenuously near the perimeter is, of course, wholly
a matter of estimation on the part of the trier. Clearly, there will be
found between these poles every conceivable variation possible.
Following the same approach, we can project a similar circle to
represent the "arising out of" requirement. At the center would be those
hazards that are restricted almost exclusively to the particular employment, such as the risk of explosion for the demolition operator. Away
from center, by way of illustration, would be certain dangers that are
fairly characteristic of general living but that are faced more frequently
by persons in a particular employment. Farther out on the radius are
risks that can be characterized as neutral. That is to say, they are risks
that are not readily associated with either the nature of the job or with
any peculiar charactierstics of the victim himself. Finally, at the perimeter are hazards that arise out of the personal needs or desires of the
worker, that are the product of his own bodily deficiencies, or that are
bought about by his individual habits or the events of his private life.
Thus it is possible to distinguish between the worker who by chance was
wounded when hit by a stray bullet and the worker whose personal
enemy sought him out for revenge while he was at work. The first is a
neutral risk that is much nearer to the circle's center than the other,
which flowed from the worker's personal affairs. The possible variations
are infinite, and the appropriate place on the circle for any given risk is
a matter of almost unlimited conjecture.
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Because any employment accident must be assessed in terms of its
location on the radius of each of the two circles, an accident event may
be securely at the center of the "during the course of" requirement and
yet out at the very edge of the circle representing "arising out of."
Conversely, the worker may be the victim of an accident that is readily
associated with the nature of his job and yet which happened at a time
or place outside his work schedule or location. The important observation to be made here is that the trier's final conclusion that the accident
risk is or is not compensable is a judgment of a composite character.
The determinations of "arising out of" and "during the course of" are
not separate, isolated operations; rather, there is a highly meaningful
interaction between the two issues, and the trier's response to one of
them is markedly tempered by his response to the other.
There is increased breadth for judgment afforded by interaction of
the two concepts. If the activity of the employee at the time of accident
brings him only barely within the course of his employment and if the
risk that produced the injury was relatively foreign to both the nature
of his duties and the environment of his job, his prospect for compensation is dark indeed. On the other hand, the worker who was injured
while actively engaged in the performance of his duty or while moving
directly from one place of work to another has a fair chance of recovery
even though his injury was occasioned by a risk to which the public in
general is exposed. Conversely, the employee who was exposed to a risk
that is peculiar to his work may be compensated even though at the time
of his accident he was engaged in conduct or in a location that brought
him only marginally within the course of his employment.
What has been described is only an approach or technique in the
process of decisionmaking. There is no formal rule or doctrine that
recognizes the interaction between the concepts.22 In fact, the language
of opinions might tempt a reader to conclude that there is no connection
between the two concepts. He learns that the opposite is true only by
persistently observing the results.
It may be helpful for our purposes to note that the interdependence
can be so expressed as to place the chief emphasis on the "during the
2'However, there is a marked tendency in the recent Louisiana decisions to afford express
recognition of the phenomenon. See, e.g., Blake v. Fidelity Cas. Co., 169 So. 2d 608, 610-11 (La.
App. 1964).
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course of" requirement. At certain times and places during the performance of activities the employee is within the course of his employment
with respect to almost any accident that may befall him, while at other
times and places he is within the course of his employment only with
respect to a highly limited group of risks. Conversely, the same interplay
can be expressed with equal ease in terms of "arising out of." Certain
risks that are intimately associated with the nature of the job will be
regarded as arising out of the employment even though the time and
place of accident and the activities of the worker are only remotely
connected with the employer's business. Risks that are common to most
persons may be rejected under the "arising out of" concept except when
the employee who encountered them was actively at work or was engaged in conduct that could be readily associated with the performance
of his duties.
Although the influence mutually exerted by the two concepts upon
each other has seldom been accorded open recognition in judicial decisions, it has served nevertheless behind the scenes. It is the source of
impulse that led courts to evolve two significant liberalizing doctrines-the "positional risk" doctrine and the proximity or "so-close"
rule.
The positional risk doctrine is an outgrowth of the earlier street risk
doctrine. The latter, in turn, had emerged fairly early in compensation
history as a palliative against certain unacceptable extremes in the "arising out of" concept. As noted earlier, the street risk doctrine found its
first justification in the language of cause:23 If the call of duty caused
the worker to expose himself to the perils of the street, said the courts,
who can gainsay that those same perils necessarily arose out of his
employment? The result rests upon causation, but the impulse urging
recovery in the street risk cases goes deeper and reaches into the phenomenon we have just described. The worker was at the center of the
"during the course of" circle when he was in the street, and this alone
could motivate a court to ignore the fact that the risk of being struck
down in traffic or of tripping upon a curb or paving stone was not
peculiar to the nature of the victim's job.
At first some effort was made to limit recognition under the street
risk doctrine to those hazards that could be associated with street travel
(such as traffic mishaps) or that were enhanced in some way by the
2'See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
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required presence of the worker in the public streets. However, this
approach was generally abandoned, and courts allowed recovery even
though the accident was not related to traveling the public streets. A
all came to be
stub of the toe on a curb or an attack by a madman
24
regarded as street risks if they occurred in the street.
However, the decisions continued to betray the true origin of the
street risk doctrine as a product of the interaction between the two parts
of the dual requirement. This is abundantly evident in those cases in
which the worker's presence in the street is not solely a response to duty.
If he was on the public way partially to serve some purpose of his
own-even though his presence there might bear a connection with his
job-his chances of recovery will be adversely affected.25 The extent to
which this is so depends upon a court's estimate of the relative nearness
of the particular accident to the center of the "during.the course of"
circle.
The true origin of the street risk rule also becomes apparent when
we examine the subsequent expansion of that rule. Once a rule such as
the street risk doctrine achieves recognition, there arises the basic question as to why the same policy that underlies it does not prompt a
similar approach to the accidental injury sustained while actively at
work, regardless of where it occurs. Must it be only with reference to
accidents in the public streets that a very strong showing on the "during
the course of" side of the ledger can operate so as to offset a decided
weakness on the "arising out of" side? The anomaly of a distinction
based solely on the accident locale is obvious. 6 If the phenomenon of
the interdependence of the two concepts we have been discussing represents a sound operating principle, it should be uniformly available for
all accidents that meet its terms. This, in fact, is what ultimately has
happened. The phrase "street risk" is gradually ceasing to have any
distinctive meaning. In its place is the broader notion that whenever the
call of duty brings the worker to the place of danger, wherever that place
may be, at the moment the danger happens to manifest itself, the resulting mishap can appropriately be recognized as an accident that arises
out of the employment. Thus the courts are arriving at what Professor
2

See Katz v. Kadans & Co., 232 N.Y. 420, 134 N.E. 330 (1922); cases cited in W. MALONE
& M. PLANT, supra note 11, at 225.
21See, e.g., Scott v. Industrial Comm'n, 105 N.E.2d 881 (Ohio App. 1951). See generally
Industrial
Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 95 Cal. App. 2d 804, 214 P.2d 41 (1950).
2
11ndustrial Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 95 Cal. App. 2d 804, 214 P.2d 41
(1950).
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Larson has happily termed the positional risk doctrine." The importance of the positional risk doctrine for present purposes is that there has
finally emerged within the language of decisions a formalized recognition of the mutual interdependence of the two concepts, "during the
course of" employment and "arising out of" employment.
It must be noted that at the present time, one class of accidents has
failed to achieve recognition under the positional risk doctrine even
though these accidents occur while the worker is engaged in the performance of his duties. These are those accidents that must be attributed
in part to the employee's own physical condition or that are the outgrowth of events in his own private life. Resorting to Larson's phrasemaking again, recovery under the positional risk doctrine is limited to
neutral risks, risks that are unrelated to the worker's bodily deficiencies
or personal affairs and are also unaffected by the nature of his particular
job or his working environment. 8 In terms of the "arising out of" circle,
the personal risk excluded under the positional risk doctrine has been
found to be farther from the center of the circle than the neutral risk.
If this is indeed true, the question to be answered is why?
In an earlier article this writer pondered the question as follows:
A worker is directed by his employer to burn meat scraps in the
back yard. If while he is there he is wounded by a stray bullet, assaulted by a madman who happened to be at large in the neighborhood, or shot for some entirely unaccountable reason, he will be entitled to compensation solely because he is in a position to invoke the
positional-risk doctrine, and he can recover merely because his duties
brought him into the path of the bullet. But if the assailant of the
butcher's helper happens to be a personal enemy who finds him at
work and shoots him because of some grudge arising out of their
private lives, the helper will be obliged to show in addition that the
general nature of his work or the environment in which he performed
his duties was calculated to increase the risk of such a personal assault.
If he fails in this respect, the court will conclude that the accident did
not arise out of the employment, although concededly it happened
during the course of it." Why should this be so? An attack by a
madman or the ricochet of a bullet intended for someone else are
surely no more characteristic risks of the job of a butcher's helper than
1 LARSON §§ 6A0, 9.50, 10.
-Id. §§ 7.20, 7.30.
2
The decisions so holding are legion. E.g., Devlin v. Ennis, 77 Idaho 342, 292 P.2d 469 (1956);
Rice v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 186 Md. 561, 48 A.2d 166 (1946).
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is the chance that an enemy who bears him an old grudge will find his
victim at work and assault him there. In both situations the performance of duty has played a causal part by bringing the victim to the
place of injury.
Again, suppose that a worker who is walking toward the machine
he intends to operate falls to the floor for absolutely no accountable
reason and suffers a head injury. The positional-risk doctrine will save
his compensation claim because his motion in doing as he was told
brought him to the place where he fell. It need not be shown that the
physical environment where he worked played any causal part; nor
need it be demonstrated that the worker's haste in reaching his machine precipitated the accident in any way. But add to this identical
picture the single fact that the worker was epileptic and that his fall
was caused by an epileptic seizure. Once this is shown he will lose his
claim unless he succeeds in showing in addition that the physical environment in which he worked contributed to the occurrence in some
way." The increased-risk test has again been brought into play. The
epileptic worker may save his case by establishing that he was on a
ladder when he suffered his seizure or that he was driving a truck and
that the seizure caused him to run off the road. But if the fall from
epilepsy occurred under such circumstances that it could plausibly
produce the identical harmful result without reference to any peculiarity of the place where he was working, the employee will lose his
compensation claim.
In both the situation of the personal assault and the situation of
the epileptic seizure it appears that the courts have retreated to the old
tort idea that the employee had only himself to blame if he was injured
and hence he does not deserve-a compensation award unless he can tie
his injury to his employment in some way. This must be regarded as a
residual trace of the old fault notion that has been repudiated in other
areas of compensation law. The attitude described is in derogation of
the familiar notion that the employer takes the employee as he finds
him. The epileptic is entitled to the same compensation protection as
the worker who is in good health. The employee who is careless or
disobedient or who brings to his job a bad moral background does not
for that reason alone lose his compensation claim. By the same token,
the fact that the worker's individual health deficiencies or his personal
life (rather than some neutral cause outside the control of either party)
has created the risk that culminates in an accidental injury should not
serve to deprive him of access to the liberal positional-risk doctrine.
Henderson v. Celanese Corp., 30 N.J. Super. 353, 104 A.2d 720 (App. Div. 1954). The sharp
and vigorous dissenting opinion of Judge Clapp is of particular interest.
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However, apart from a few sporadic decisions or dicta,31 there is as
yet little indication that the courts are prepared to go this far with
reference to the personal risk.3

With reference to the above extract I should add that my observations in criticism of the prevailing treatment of the idiopathic fall situation were largely inspired by the sharp and vigorous opinion of Justice
Clapp, who dissented from a denial of compensation for an idiopathic
fall in the New Jersey case Henderson v. Celanese Corp.3 Ten years
after the Henderson decision and two years after the above paragraphs
were written, an identical idiopathic fall controversy was again presented to the Supreme Court of New Jersey.34 This time the court
unanimously overruled Henderson on the basis of Justice Clapp's dissent in the earlier case. It held that the personal risk of an idiopathic
fall is compensable if the fall takes place while the employee is actively
at work. This decisibn may become the basis for an extention of the
positional risk concept to personal risks other than the idiopathic fall.
The case goes far in confirming the present thesis, that an accident in
the center of the "during the course of" circle can influence a court to
expand compensable risks beyond what was previously considered to
arise out of the employment.
Conversely, suppose that the accident-producing risk is at the center of the "arising out of" circle but that the worker was so situated or
so occupied when he was injured that it was not during the course of
his employment. Can a very close affinity between the accident hazard
and the worker's job compensate for glaring shortcomings with reference to where the worker was or what he was doing? Recent decisions
strongly suggest that such may indeed be the case. In Meo v. Commercial Can Corp.3 1 the claimant was the supervisor of defendant's plant.
At the time in question a strike was in progress, and the claimant had
been continuously engaged in strikebreaking activities on behalf of his
employer. One morning while he was standing in his own front yard he
was assaulted by disgruntled strikers, who were motivated by his anti31

See, e.g., Henderson v. Celanese Corp., 30 N.J. Super. 353, 104 A.2d 720 (App. Div. 1954)
(Clapp, J., dissenting). See also Livingston v. Henry & Hall, 59 So. 2d 892 (La. App. 1952)

(compensation awarded for personally motivated assault under positional-risk doctrine).
32

Malone, Some Recent Developments in the Substantive Law of Workmen's Compensation,
16 VAND. L. REv. 1039, 1051-52 (1963) (footnotes renumbered).
-30 N.J. Super. 353, 104 A.2d 720 (App. Div. 1954).
3
'George v. Great Eastern Food Prods., Inc., 44 N.J. 44, 207 A.2d 161 (1965).
376 N.J. Super. 484, 184 A.2d 891 (Bergen County Ct. 1962).
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labor activities. Meo was compensated for the injuries that resulted
from the assault. Although it is clearly recognized that accidents occurring at home before working hours are not generally regarded as happening during the course of employment, the nature of the risk that
brought about the assault in this case was so peculiarly characteristic
of the job that this consideration overrode the obvious weakness with
reference to the course of employment.
In a recent Michigan case,3 an employee who worked in proximity
to quantities of cyanide returned home at the close of the day in good
health. Apparently cyanide had become lodged under his fingernails or
on his workshoes, and he ingested some of the substance into his mouth
in some unaccountable way while preparing for bed. The result was
almost immediate death. Benefits were awarded his widow despite the
fact that the deceased was not within the course of his employment at
the time of the fatal accident. The risk of cyanide poisoning was a risk
inherent in the job, and the deceased, like Meo the strikebreaker, carried
the danger with him after working hours and after he had left the
premises. The "arising out of" showing was too strong to be ignored
even under the circumstances here.
A final illustration of the interaction of the two concepts is accidents that befall the employee while he is going to or coming from work.
For practical reasons of administration, courts have established very
arbitrary boundaries in this area of "during the course of." In general,
the employee proceeding to work steps into the course of his employment only when he first places his foot upon the work premises."
Accordingly, it is confidently to be expected that a school teacher who
was struck in traffic in a public street when she was within hailing
distance of the school yard would be denied compensation. But now
alter the risk so that it assumes elements of danger characteristic of the
school teacher's job: let her be passing along the public sidewalk just
outside the playground when she is struck by a ball batted from within
by one of the children. Under these circumstances an award will proba3
bly be forthcoming; at least the Supreme Court of Minnesota so held. 1
Again, strength in the "arising out of" concept transcended the limitations of the "during the course of" requirement.
The work premises are usually extended to include closely neigh3

'Zytkewick v. Ford Motor Co., 340 Mich. 309, 65 N.W.2d 813 (1954).

311 LARSON

§ 15.11.

38Nelson v. City of St. Paul, 249 Minn. 53, 81 N.W.2d 272 (1957).
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boring areas in order to cover a limited group of special risks whenever
the immediate approach to the work premises is fraught with some
special hazard, such as an adjacent railroad track or a noticeably congested thoroughfare. This type of situation occurs with such frequency
that novel expressions have been devised for its administration. Such
innovations as the "threshold" doctrine, the "proximity" rule, and the
"so-close" rule39 have enabled courts to recognize the additional work
hazard and yet retain the premises limitation for general usage.
ALTERNATIVE CRITERIA

The observations in the foregoing pages have shown that there are
few time periods during the daily work routine of an employee that are
absolutely within the course of employment. Similarly, there is little
employee behavior during the average workday that can be so regarded
without question. It is the same when we examine the nature of the
typical work hazards. Of all the different risks to which the worker can
be exposed during the course of his day, only a few are risks that
unquestionably arise out of his employment. The two terms are virtually
meaningless as arbitrary propositions. In the last analysis, the process
of determining work connection in a concrete controversy is one that
involves the balancing of factors of time, place, and employee activity
against each other and then against the trier's estimate of the closeness
of the relationship of employment risk to the nature of the work." For
this reason, the most appropriate phraseology for characterizing accidents in a compensation statute might be language that would emphasize the balancing process of risk determination and would incorporate
in a list of some or all of the factors that should enter into the scale. In
a sense, determining "arising out of" and "during the course of" bears
a marked similarity to determining negligence or the existence of a
nuisance. In this connection the Restatement of Torts of the American
Law Institute, after defining negligence as conduct involving an unrea'I LARSON § 15.13. Section 15.15 of the same volume indicates clearly Larson's subscription
to the same thesis sponsored herein.
"'It appears that Professor Larson and the writer arrived at this conclusion independently at
about the same time. Larson's persuasive explanation is in terms of a suggested "quantum theory."
Id. § 29. The intervolvement of the two requirements first occurred to me as I collected the cases
of one jurisdiction in preparation for my local text, W. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 192 (1951). See also id. §§194, 197, taking the same approach with
respect to the assault cases and the cases involving personal risks.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

1973]

sonable risk of harm," defined unreasonableness as reflecting the balance between the apparent magnitude of the risk on one hand and the
42
social utility of the act or the manner of its performance on the other.
To assist in achieving this balance the Restatement lists those factors
that should be regarded as important in determining the utility of the
conduct.4 3 Does this approach, a balancing operation followed by a
listing of certain appropriate factors, commend itself as a substitute for
the blunt requirements of "during the course of" and "arising out of"
the employment?
This writer entertains serious doubts about such an approach. In
the first place, definitions of negligence and nuisance in the Restatement
perform chiefly a textbook function. They amount to little, more than
skillful condensations that introduce the detailed mass of scholarly commentary that follows. Without this elborative material, the black-letter
definitions lose much of their significance. In legislation this may prove
to be awkward and unserviceable. A more important reason for rejecting this approach, however, is the basic difference between the character
of the balancing factors in neligence and those considerations that determine the existence of a work connection. Negligence is necessarily concerned with a weighing of true abstractions against each other. The
conflict between values is dramatic and readily articulated: Does the
seriousness of the harm to be anticipated outweight the value society
would gain by allowing the defendant to do what he is doing? Is the risk
too great to be allowed in view of the expense that would be incurred if
available alternatives were adopted?
In contrast, the kinds of items in conflict with one another in
determining the compensability of an accident cannot be easily expressed as abstract terms. Instead, there is a variety of unique accident
situations. Whether a particular risk arises out of or occurs during the
course of employment is not a matter that can be determined through
resort to a formula of any kind.
Finally, can any new phrase be added to or substituted for the
familiar dual requirement to the advantage of the risk-sorting operation? As already noted, the elimination of one of the two requirements
(thus placing the entire burden upon the one that remains) would only
deprive the trier of means to offset a weakness in one area of the inquiry
4

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
42

1d. § 291.

-Id. § 292.

§ 282 (1965).
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with strength in the other. Since we cannot properly reject either facet

of the inquiry, perhaps they could be consolidated into some single
happy phrase, such as "employment-connected accident" or "accident

related to the employment," thus purposefully omitting any suggestion
concerning the directions the inquiry should follow. This would afford
an abundance of elbow room for the trier as he passes judgment. But
the trier enjoys the same latitude under the "during the course of" and

"arising out of" requirements when they are properly handled. Furthermore, under the presently prevailing setup the direction of the inquiry
is suggested but not compelled.

There remains one device that may have more to commend it than
the substitutes suggested above. Could the two terms be connected in

the disjunctive to provide compensation coverage for any accident that
happens either during the course of the employment or that arises out

of it?44 The provision would meet the objection of Professor Bohlen,

"This, in fact, is the provision as it appears in the present Utah statute: "Every employee...
who is injured, and the dependents of every such employee whois killed, by accident arising out
" UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-45 (1953) (emphasis
of or in the course of his employment ....
added). This provision "in the alternative" was added by amendment in 1919. Law of March 13,
1919, ch. 63, § 3113, [1919] Laws of Utah 158. Prior to that time the dual requirement prevailed
in the Utah statute. Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial. Comm'n, 58 Utah 608, 201 P. 173
(1921).
Since the 1919 amendment, the Utah courts have frequently referred to the difference between
the Utah provision in the alternative and the dual requirement prevailing elsewhere. The language,
if considered alone, would indeed suggest that the Utah courts feel that they are free to discount
decisions in other jurisdictions that require that the accident must both arise out of the employment
and occur during the course of it: "Since our statute requires that compensation be paid to a
workman who is injured by accident in the course of his employment, without requiring that the
injury or accident arise out of the employment, these cases (from other jurisdictions) argue for,
and not against the granting of compensation in this case." Tavey v. Industrial Comm'n, 106 Utah
489, 493, 150 P.2d 379, 381 (1944); accord, M. & K. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 112 Utah 488,
492, 189 P.2d 132, 134 (1948); Utah Apex Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 67 Utah 537, 545,
248 P. 490, 492 (1926); Twin Peaks Canning Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 589, 596, 196 P.
853, 856 (1921).
A review of the Utah cases, however, strongly indicates that the provision in the alternative
has had no discernible effect on the ultimate decisions reached by the courts. In each instance, the
conclusion arrived at was the same that would fairly be expected in most jurisdictions having the
dual requirement. For example, the Twin Peaks CanningCo. case involved the death of a youthful
employee who, while playing a prank on a fellow worker whom he had confined in the plant
elevator, was crushed and killed by the movement of the elevator. Most of the opinion was devoted
to a finding that the horseplay in which the plaintiff was engaged had been tolerated by the
employer in the past and hence could be regarded as occuring during the course of the employment.
The emphasis that the court placed upon the unique Utah provision was only in recognition of the
fact that at the time of the decision there was considerable difference of opinion throughout the
country as to whether recovery was proper in horseplay cases when the plaintiff was an active
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noted earlier, that an accident occurring during the course of employment need not arise out of it in order to qualify. At the same time, every
accident that arises out of the employment would be compensated without regard to when or where it may happen. However, by abandoning
any effort to make a selective determination of risks, such an approach
results in workmen's compensation amounting to little less than overall
accident insurance that protects any workers against any mishap that
may befall him.
participant. The court's alignment with the more liberal jurisdictions was fortified by reference to
the unique Utah provision. However, the conclusion was entirely in line with decisions elsewhere.
It is especially noteworthy that a jurisdiction having the dual requirement would very likely have
justified an imposition of liability under the facts of the Twin Peaks case by emphasizing that an
instrumentality of the employer (the elevator) was the source of the harm. See Savage v. Otis
Elevator Co., 136 N.J.L. 419, 56 A.2d 595 (1948). In other vordg, a court, by emphasizing the
affinity between the source of the danger and the working environment, could strengthen the
,,arising out of' aspect of the accident in compensation for any weakness in the during-course-of
showing.
The same observation is true of the Utah Apex Mining Co. case. A mine employee was injured
while leaving the employer's premises by an infrequently used route. He came in contact with a
cable charged with electricity that was used in connection with mining operations. The employee,
however, was engaged as a carpenter. It is clear from the opinion that the court was concerned
solely with the question whether an injury that takes place while an employee is departing the
premises by some route other than the one most frequently used can nevertheless be regarded as
being within the course of the employment. In finding that he should be so regarded, the Utah
court reached a conclusion that would have been reached in many jurisdictions. The observation
in the opinion that it is unnecessary in Utah that the accident must also arise out of the employment
contributes virtually nothing to the decision. It is obvious that in any jurisdiction the risk of
electrocution on mining premises will be regarded as a risk arising out of the employment.
Again,in the M. & K. Corp. case, there was no question that by the time of the decision courts
everywhere had concluded that an employee who is engaged in hauling on the public highway and
who is injured in a traffic accident has sustained an accident that arose out of his employment.
The only problem facing the court was whether or not the fact that the victim had allowed his 14year-old son to operate the truck at the time of accident should serve to exclude the accident from
the course of employment. The court was obliged to note that a majority of the decisions from
other jurisdictions would allow a recovery under the same circumstances.
Two Utah decisions that stressed the unique character of the Utah statute were concerned with
the question of whether or not the accident arose out of the employment. The first of these, Tavey
v. Industrial Commission, involved an idiopathic fall. The plaintiff fell to the floor and struck her
head upon a low bookshelf maintained by the employer on the work premises. Despite the fact
that the court emphasized that it was unimportant whether or not the accident arose out of the
employment so long as it occurred during the course of it, the court nevertheless emphasized the
contribution of the working environment (the "arising out of" aspect). The situation before the
court in the Tavey case, involving a fall against a structure on the employer's premises, was one
in which compensation is generally awarded in jurisdiction that maintain the dual requirement.
Larson, in referring to the Tavey decision in section 12.12 of his treatise, made special reference
to the case as involving a dangerous corner or projection. That writer makes no mention of reliance
upon the unique Utah provision.
A Utah decision of particular interest in connection with the "arising out of" requirement is
State Road Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n,56 Utah 252, 190 P. 544 (1920). The deceased was an
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One distinct advantage of the dual requirement is that it can not

only encourage an expansion of coverage, but also induce the exclusion
of an inappropriate risk as well. Just as a strong, persuasive showing
on "during the course of" can result in protection against accident risks
that otherwise would be rejected, so a weak or marginal showing with
reference to time or place of accident can result in rejection unless it is
highly suggestive of the peculiar nature of the working environment. In
other words, the healthy effect of duality is that it can serve either to
expand or contract coverage.
outdoor worker who was apparently seeking to escape the rigors of a sudden storm by seeking
shelter when he was struck by lightning. Under such circumstances, there would have been little
difficulty in most jurisdictions in concluding that the accident arose out. of the employment. The
victim was an outdoor worker and he had been actively at work at the time the storm arose. The
Supreme Court of Utah, however, chose to observe, "We are of the opinion, however, that the
accident did not arise out of the employment for the reason there does not appear to be any causal
connection. This, however, in view of our present law, is immaterial. The insurer is liable whether
the accident arose out of the employment or whether it arose in the course thereof." Id. at 256,
190 P. at 545. This is a case that under the positional risk doctrine would have given no difficulty
in a jurisdiction having the dual requirement.
As observed earlier, the writer has been unable to discover any Utah decision that afforded
coverage for an accident that would have been excluded in other states. In this connection, one
Utah case is of particular interest for the reason that it served as the fountainhead for the "threshold doctrine" or, as it is sometimes called, the "so-close" rule. This position, it will be recalled, is
one under which recovery is allowed for accidents that occur while the employee is going to or
coming from work and is injured at a spot of special danger immediately adjacent to the work
premises. Here it can be said that the Utah Supreme Court afforded true national leadership.
Interestingly enough, however, the court expressly observed that the unique character of the Utah
provision was immaterial to the conclusion reached in that decision:
It is not, however, necessary or desirable in the determination of this case to attempt a
definition of these terms or to differentiate between accidents arising out of or in the
course of the employment. If there is liability for the injury under consideration, it must
be found upon the inferable fact that the danger incident to crossing this railroad track,
by reason of its location and proximity to the packing plant, must be held to have been
within the contemplation of the parties at the date of the employment. No other theory
finds support in the decisions of the reported cases.
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 60 Utah 161, 165, 207 P. 148, 150 (1922), aff'd, 263
U.S. 418 (1923).
Finally, it should be pointed out that the Utah courts have given no indication that compensation could be awarded for an accident that occurred clearly outside the course of the employment
merely on the showing that the risk was of a character closely associated with the nature of the
work. This is apparent in the going-to and coming-from work cases decided by the Utah court.
Compensation, for instance, was denied an automobile salesman who was injured in traffic while
returning home after attending a salesmen's meeting held on his employer's premises. The court
was satisfied to observe that he was not acting in the course of his employment at the time of the
injury. No mention was even made of the fact that injuries in traffic clearly arise out of the
employment of a salesman who is continually engaged in demonstrating automobiles. CoveyBallard Motor Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 64 Utah i, 227 P. 1028 (1924).
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Readers would be well advised to regard with skepticism the tendency to accept any expansion of workmen's compensation as a matter
for congratulation. Over the years, the statutes have been interpreted to
accommodate more and more accidents sustained by more and more
people at more and more times and places and under more and more
circumstances. This has been a source of pride in the past, but perhaps
the time has arrived to question whether it should remain so. Originally,
of course, any liberalizing of the intolerable strictures of nineteenth
century individualism was welcomed. The purpose of compensation was
to obviate the necessity of establishing fault under the complex network
of torts doctrines then prevailing. In theory the worker was to bargain
off his claim for full damages in return for an assured recovery of
modestly scheduled benefits from even the blameless employer.
But during the intervening years, the fault requirement has been
disintegrating rapidly. Indeed, more than a decade ago Arkansas and
Mississippi still rejected workmen's compensation, probably because it
had become relatively easy to establish negligence through presumptions and inferences and the "unholy trinity" of employer defenses had
been emasculated by the courts. Why should the worker surrender the
blessings of a full and generous recovery in tort? Consider the happy lot
of the railroad worker: solemn lip service to negligence is still being paid
in the opinions, but under the tender ministrations of the United States
Supreme Court 5 the fault requirement has become little more than a
pious incantation mumbled during the instructions to a sympathetic
jury. In short, if bigger and better recoveries do indeed mark the road
to progress, the workmen's compensation route may well be one to
avoid.
Workmen's compensation has also helped to spawn its own competitors, which raise new and difficult problems. If sound social and
economic theory demand that industry pay the cost of employee injury
and pass it alone to the ultimate user of its goods and services, do not
the same considerations demand that motor vehicle transportation do
likewise? The prospect of no-fault auto liability is, of course, fast becoming a complex reality. No one knows yet how much personal injury
damages will be reduced, but there is absolutely no indication that
recoveries will be reduced to the level of workmen's compensation benefits. The new dilemma is one that challenges the lawyer: an employed
"5See, e.g., Gibson v. Thompson, 355 U.S. 18 (1957); Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S.
500 (1957).
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truck driver who is disabled in a collission is entitled to claim support
of his accident cost from two groups-those who consume or use his
employer's product and those who share with him the use of automobiles and who pay appropriate insurance premiums. Should he receive
one amount as a victim of his employer's industry and another as a
victim of an automobile accident, and should this be the case in the face
of the fact that fault is equally immaterial to both claims?
A similar observation is appropriate for the worker who falls on a
factory floor that had been polished with a highly slippery wax available
to consumers. The wax-maker must answer for his defective product
without reference to negligence, so the worker is a victim both of his
employer's industry and of the industry of the wax-maker. Should the
consumers of the wax be obliged to pay more for the fall than the
patrons of the worker's employer when neither industry is at "fault"?
In the present state of our products liability law, the wax users will pay
substantially more.
Undoubtedly these differences will eventually be reconciled. But
until then, it would not be prudent to apply language that would extend
the area of coverage for workmen's compensation. The objective most
to be desired is a device that provides for passing an intelligent, creative
judgement upon risks as they are presented and that suggests as expediently as possible the appropriate channels for deliberation. As I survey
the field with these goals in mind, I cannot find any device that can
compete successfully with the dual requirement in the form in which it
emerged in England more than seventy-five years ago.

